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A Conversation with the Chief
Prosecutor of United States
Military Commissions
Brigadier General Mark Martins*
Thank you, Dean Mitchell for that warm and gracious welcome
and introduction.
It is so tremendous to be here in this distinguished institute and
law school and in the tradition of international legal studies. Michael,
Avi, great to see you again—Avi, in your former work in Human
Rights First and our work together on the Counterinsurgency
Manual, the Army, and Marine Corps Manual for Counterinsurgency;
and, of course, Michael, who I hadn’t seen for twenty years.

*

In September of 2011, Brigadier General Mark Martins became Chief
Prosecutor of Military Commissions. Over the previous year, in
Afghanistan, Martins was commander of the Rule of Law Field
Force-Afghanistan and of the dual-hat NATO Rule of Law Field
Support Mission. The prior year, also in Afghanistan, he had served as
the first and Interim Commander of Joint Task Force 435 and then as
its first Deputy Commander upon Senate Confirmation of Vice Admiral
Robert Harward. Immediately prior to his deployment to Afghanistan,
Brigadier General Martins co-led the interagency Detention Policy Task
Force created by President Obama in January 2009. Commissioned in
the infantry after graduating first in order of merit from the United
States Military Academy in 1983, Brigadier General Martins served as a
platoon leader and staff officer in the 82d Airborne Division. He then
became a judge advocate and has since served in a variety of legal and
non-legal positions. He has been deployed to zones of armed conflict for
more than five years, including service as Chief of Staff of the U.S.
Kosovo Force, Staff Judge Advocate for First Armored Division and
then Multi-National Force—Iraq, and his recent duties with Rule of Law
Field Support Teams across eight provinces and twenty-three key
districts in Afghanistan. Brigadier General Martins is a Rhodes Scholar
(Balliol College, P.P.E., 1st Class Honours, 1985) and a graduate of
Harvard Law School (magna cum laude, 1990). He holds an L.L.M. in
Military Law and a Masters Degree in National Security Strategy,
having attended the Infantry and Judge Advocate Officer Basic courses,
the Judge Advocate Graduate course, the Combined Arms and Services
Staff School, the Command and General Staff College, and the National
War College. He has published widely in professional journals. His
awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the NATO
Meritorious Service Medal, the Department of State Meritorious Honor
Award, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star (two awards), and the
Army Meritorious Service Medal (multiple awards). He has also earned
the Ranger Tab, Pathfinder Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Senior
Parachutist
Badge,
and
Air
Assault
Badge.
In April of 2011, Brigadier General Martins was awarded the Harvard
Law School Medal of Freedom.
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It is hard to believe that twenty years ago we were trying to think
through how an International Criminal Court might deal with shadow
groups of various levels of allegiance in connection to a government,
might be tried for violations of international law, and your scholarship
has meant so much to us in the field and in court rooms around the
world. So it is just tremendous to see you again and to be here.
You know, coming to this distinguished institute of higher
learning, having spent most of the last decade in rural parts of Iraq
and Afghanistan, I am kind of reminded of maybe the most famous
occasion in which a backwoodsman came to the academy.
You will remember it too, from our history. It was Abraham
Lincoln in 1858, and he is debating Steven A. Douglas in the
senatorial campaign in Illinois, and one of the Lincoln-Douglas
debates occurs at Knox College in Western Illinois. Then, as now, it
is a preeminent private liberal arts college.
Lincoln, of course, who is a self-schooled person, no higher
education of any sort, comes to Knox. Historians say it was a pivotal
moment in the lead-up of the Civil War, the whole course of peace
and then war might have been different had Lincoln not denounced
slavery on moral terms that day.
So Knox, as the legend of the debate goes, Knox had set up
scaffolding. If you had been out to Knox, there is an old main
building, and they wanted everyone who was coming—it is a railroad
junction town, so people were coming from all over the Midwest to
Knox—they gathered out in front of the old main building, and they
had set up scaffolding on the second floor so the candidates could be
heard and seen.
So Steven A. Douglas, a compact man, gets through the window
out onto this scaffolding, no problem. Lincoln, of course, a tall,
gangly man who was to become our sixteenth President in just a
couple of years, kind of gets through the window with difficulty out
onto this makeshift stage and is said to have quipped, “at least now I
will be able to say that I have been through college.”
I won’t be able to say I have been through the great Case
Western Reserve University School of Law after this, but I am
indebted to you for allowing me to share it with you this afternoon. It
is also great to be in Ohio.
My first platoon sergeant was from Ohio, a very grounded,
wonderful non-commissioned officer, repetitive tours in Vietnam. I
was a green infantry lieutenant, and we were out on our first field
problem in Fort Irwin, California, in the high desert, and we had
trained hard all day with my platoon, and went to bed out near our
foxhole.
The Sergeant elbows me at about two o’clock in the morning and
he says, “Sir, look up, and tell me what you see.” And I looked up,
and I said, “Well, I see a heaven full of stars Platoon Sergeant.”
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He says, “Sir, what does that tell you?” And I didn’t really know
where he was going with this question. But I wanted to impress him
with my profound keen intellect. So I said, “Well, astronomically,
that tells me there are billions of stars, perhaps trillions of planets.
Theologically, it tells me that God is great, and we are but small and
insignificant. Meteorologically, it tells me it is a clear night; should
be a clear day tomorrow, great day for training.”
I said, “Well, what does that tell you, Platoon Sergeant?” And
you know, I thought I really impressed him with this. He was
pausing. He says, “Sir, it tells me that somebody stole our tent.”
That was the last time I was consciously trying to be profound.
And I won’t try to be profound today, even though we are dealing
with some profound issues, some serious and profound issues. I want
to talk to you for the next twenty to twenty-five minutes about the
reformed military commission system under the Military Commissions
Act of 2009.1
This is a system that the Dean’s introduction indicates in almost
every phrase and word the connection of this system in people’s
minds, to images formed of Guantanamo a decade ago. And yet, the
world’s view of this system and of Guantanamo is not merely a
function of just images. There were serious legal errors in the
framework with which we started out a decade ago.
In 2004, the Supreme Court held that detainees held under the
law of armed conflict must have a meaningful opportunity to confront
the basis under which they are detained.2
In 2006, the Court held that if we are to try somebody under the
law of armed conflict, we must comply with common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions,3 and then in 2008, the Court granted the great
writ, the writ of habeas corpus, access to our federal courts, to
detainees,4 those cases of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld in 2004, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld in 2006, and then the Boumediene v. Bush case in 2008.
Where we are now, I will submit to you and I am grateful to have
the opportunity to answer whatever questions you have, tough
questions in an academic setting, where I know that you are thinking
about these things carefully. It is not going to be just about slogans.
I want to talk to you about these issues because where we are
now is at a mature and accountable institution; that five different
acts of Congress, and I am talking about the two different Military
Commissions Acts of ‘06 and ‘09, and then successive national defense

1.

Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950t (2013).

2.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).

3.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631–32 (2006).

4.

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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authorization acts, two different presidents coming at it from different
perspectives, and now, increasingly, our courts have weighed in on.
This is the only lawful path forward for reasons I am going to
mention for trials of some of the most serious alleged members of AlQaeda and associated forces. So, military commissions.
Let me say four things up front, given the international
perspective of many of you and being part of the great Cox Center,
and I will put this in sort of an international context.
First of all, it is really important, I think, to distinguish between
detention under the law of armed conflict and a criminal trial under
the law of armed conflict. So detention under the law of armed
conflict is the taking of a combatant off the battlefield, a regular
combatant, somebody wearing a uniform or somebody not.5
You have that authority. States have that authority until the
end of the conflict. Not a controversial source of authority under
international humanitarian law under the law of armed conflict.
That’s one topic, and that tends to be associated with Guantanamo
detentions in Afghanistan and Iraq that are occurring in the context
of hostilities.
Then you have the trial of alleged violators of international law,
of the law of armed conflict; criminal trials. So if you don’t make that
distinction, I find people on all sides of these different issues if you
imagine four quadrants. You can be for the system of detention that
is right now supervised by our federal courts: you have habeas with
regard to Guantanamo detainees and you have the habeas petitions in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, federal
court, providing independent review of the lawfulness of detention.
So you might be for that system, say, and against military
criminal trials. You might be for the high standard of proof, the rigor
that I will talk about with regard to a criminal trial, putting
somebody on notice of charges and trying them in a criminal trial in a
military commission, and against the longer term detention that can
happen even under federal court supervision. So you can be for one,
against the other. You could be for both or against both.
I have found that you see people all around the world in every
one of the quadrants. So it is important so as not to make any
analytical errors and first level errors to see that distinction.
Having spent a good deal of time in the law of armed conflict
detention effort around the world in Afghanistan and Iraq, I am now
clearly working in this area of criminal trials. So what I am talking
about today is military commissions, which is distinctly the criminal
5.

LTC RICHARD P. DIMEGLIO ET AL., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
DESKBOOK, 96–97 (MAJ William J. Johnson & MAJ Andrew D.
Gillman
eds.,
2012),
available
at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/
LOAC-Deskbook2012.pdf.
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trials aspect that must be, I think, disentangled. So that’s the first
observation.
The second is, since 2006, we have very clearly been within
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The court held, as I
said, that you must comply with that. What was that rule? That if
you are going to try an individual under the law of armed conflict,
you must provide a regularly constituted court affording all of the
judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.6
So we are clearly operating within that international legal obligation.
The third point I will make up front is that two other sources of
authority—we are not party to the additional protocols to the Geneva
Conventions—but in early 2010, our government indicated that we
were recognizing two other provisions, Article 75 of Additional
Protocol I and all of Additional Protocol II; that we were following
them out of a sense of legal obligation.7
And as you know, in customary international law, that’s one piece
of customary international law. The other piece is long-standing state
practice. But we made it clear that we were following Additional
Protocol I, Article 75, and all of Additional Protocol II out of a socalled opinio juris, and those provide additional safeguards regarding
the criminal trial of individuals, both in international armed conflict
for Article 75, Additional Protocol I, and non-international armed
conflict, for Additional Protocol II.8
And then, finally, military commissions can be understood as a
national forum for offenses against the law of armed conflict, which is
important to point out. Even in our international courts—
International Criminal Court, Article 10 and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Article 9—you have
got concepts of complimentarity and concurrent jurisdiction.9

6.

Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630–32.

7.

Law of War Detention and the President’s Executive Order Establishing
Periodic Review Boards for Guantanamo Detainees: Hearing Before H.
Armed Servs. Comm., 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of William J.
Lynn, III, Deputy Sec’y of Def.).

8.

See id.

9.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 10, opened for
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (stipulating that nothing in
the statute conflicts or limits existing or developing international law);
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, art. 9,
U.N. Doc. S/25704 and Add.1 (May 3, 1993), adopted by S.C. Res. 827,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), last amended by S.C. Res. 1877,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1877 (July 7, 2009) (establishing that the Tribunal
shall have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute).
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No one has conceived that national courts wouldn’t have a role in
prosecuting crimes against the law of armed conflict, right? I mean,
the community and nations want as many possible forums in which to
try those who have committed such offenses. So those are four points
up front that I think try to put military commissions into context.
And the Geneva Conventions, among other sources of authority,
clearly recognize military courts of nations as long-standing, law of
armed conflict forums. They have had a long-standing pedigree.
So what are commissions? I will start with what they are not.
They are not the secret, exclusive, separate terror tribunal that some,
frankly, sought ten years ago and others feared. That’s not what
happened. What we have now is a system that is authorized under a
law passed by Congress and signed into law by the President that
provides all of the protections I would submit that are consistent with
our values. So what are they?
Well, they are military courts, the system that I have been
practicing in all of my career. It is a system that is regularized, a
regularly constituted court by the Military Commissions Act.10 It lays
out the procedures by which they are constituted and run.11
The process begins with something called referral, referral of
charges to a military commission, and in its first meaning, a military
commission, a military court, refers to that board of officers, that
panel, that jury fact finder in the system.12 A panel of officers is the
military commission.
So how does the commission get charges? It is through this
process of referral formalized under the statute. It begins with an
investigation coming to me, to my office establishing in fact, in
evidence, that someone has violated one of the thirty-two crimes that
are codified in the Act.13
These are long-standing law of armed conflict violations:
attacking civilians, attacking civilian objects, murder of protected
persons, using a flag of surrender improperly, perfidy, treachery, and
terrorism in the context of hostilities.14
So I get evidence that one of these things has occurred, and if the
evidence is admissible, if there is a reasonable prospect of success on
the merits at a full trial, a full adversarial trial, I swear charges or
someone in my office swears charges. I actually then endorse the
10.

Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948b (2013).

11.

Id.

12.

Id. § 950c; DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS,
UNITED
STATES
II-34–II-36
(2010),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/d2010manual.pdf (last visited Dec. 30,
2014).

13.

10 U.S.C. § 950t.

14.

Id. § 950t(1)–(3), (17)–(18), (24).

488

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2014
Conversation with Chief Prosecutor of United States Military Commissions

charges after reviewing them independently myself. I will endorse
them and forward them to a convening authority.
A convening authority in military justice is historically a
commander, and convening authority is part of command.15
When I was a field commander in Afghanistan, I had convening
authority as part of maintaining the discipline, morale, welfare, and
accomplishment of the mission of my unit and troops, and convening
authority was one piece of command, part of the responsibility and
authority of a commander, to maintain that discipline and to
accomplish that mission.
So a commander has convening authority.
The convening
authority of the military commission is a senior official designated by
the Secretary of Defense.16 It is either the Secretary of Defense under
the statute or a designated officer, a senior officer.
That’s Mr. Paul Oostburg Sanz right now, who also happens to
be the General Counsel of the Department of Navy. A senior officer
has this convening authority. He must, with the advice of a legal
adviser, a trained person within military justice, and a lawyer with
criminal justice background, review the charges; find that the
evidence shows that a crime was committed; that the accused is the
one who did it; and that the offense states an offense under the
Military Commissions Act of 2009.
If he finds those things, he will refer the case. There is that word
“referral” to a military commission. At that point, the chief trial
judge of the trial judiciary appoints a judge to the case to preside,
who has the statutory authority to preside over the case.
Now, this is not an Article III independent life-tenured
independent judge. I would submit it is an independent judge,
typically an Army Colonel, Navy Captain, Air Force Colonel, Marine
Corps Colonel. It is somebody with military justice, who is in a
separate chain of command for independence and has statutory
protection from any kind of influence, from people within the
executive branch.17
This is the same trial judiciary that we use in our military justice
system. Although not Article III judges, I would ask any of you to
look at their decisions and then defy you to say they are not
independent.
I mean, one military commission judge did not allow Abu Ghraib
to be destroyed following allegations that arose in Abu Ghraib; he

15.

See Legal Services: Defense/Personal Representative Services
Addendum, JAG (last visited Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.jag.navy.mil/
legal_services/defense_services_addendum.htm.

16.

U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 12, at II-2.

17.

See 10 U.S.C. § 948j.
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saw it as a crime scene and defied very senior level, even presidential
direction, to have Abu Ghraib destroyed for operational purposes.18
Also, at the beginning of the military commission’s experience in
2009, the President had ordered a stay—wanted to abate proceedings,
and the judge refused to abate proceedings.19 So these are people who
are independent, very senior, retirement eligible, judge advocates
serving on the bench. So you have the judge.
The panel is a board of officers.20 In a noncapital case, it is at
least five.21 In a capital case it is at least twelve, and these are
officers drawn from the 200,000 plus officers, active duty officers of all
services serving worldwide.22 They are selected by the convening
authority.23
This isn’t a Sixth Amendment jury of one’s peers randomly drawn
from the district wherein the crime shall have been committed; they
are selected by a convening authority, same exact statutory criteria
used in military courts-martial. The convening authority—and I have
a lot of experience selecting different types of panels, considering age,
education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial
temperament—so the convening authority selects a panel from
amongst all of those officers.
So officers serving on the demilitarized zone in Korea, in
Afghanistan, Iraq, post camps, and stations around the United States
all are eligible, and the convening authority selects them, essentially
selecting the jury pool.
That jury, that pool, is then subjected to rigorous examination
and challenge by counsel from both sides with challenges for cause to
be liberally granted and peremptory challenges also exercised by both
sides. So you get an impartial fact finder.
The case is then tried, and the trial process, sharply adversarial,
looks very much like what you are familiar with in civilian criminal
trials; it has all of those guarantees, judicial guarantees, recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.
The accused is presumed innocent. The prosecution must prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the highest standard known in our
law. The accused is entitled to notice, specific notice of charges in a
language he or she understands: the right to counsel and choice of
18.

Christiane Amanpour & Ayman Mohyeldin, Judge: Abu Ghraib a Crime
Scene,
CNN
(June
21,
2004)
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/06/21/iraq.abuse.trial/.

19.

Id.

20.

10 U.S.C. § 950f.

21.

DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 12, at II-22.

22.

Id.

23.

See id.
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counsel; and in a capital case, learned counsel at government
expense—a right that Congress was interested in providing because of
concerns relating to access to counsel in Guantanamo—a right we
don’t provide our own service members in terms of learned, civilian,
death penalty qualified counsel at government expense.
The right to presence: Hamdan was actually a case involving a
presence issue, but a very strong right to presence at trial. Protection
against self-incrimination; protection against the use of any
statements obtained as a result of torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment, and the standard for admissibility of an
accused’s statements is voluntariness; the right to witnesses, to
present evidence on one’s own behalf; cross-examine government
witnesses, witnesses and evidence that the accused obtained with the
power of the state, compulsory process of the state to get that
evidence into the court in front of that military commission jury.
The right to exculpatory evidence: you are familiar, those of you
taking criminal law, and I talked to two of your 3L classmates who
ran with me this morning, you were very well represented by Joshua
and Graham. I know they have learned Brady v. Maryland24 and
Giglio,25 I mean exculpatory evidence. So the prosecution has an
obligation to provide those things that undercut the government’s
case. It may be exculpatory, tend to reduce the belief the person is
guilty or lessen the sentence, the appropriate sentence, the severity of
the crime, and then even something that would go to the credibility of
the prosecution’s witnesses—Giglio evidence. If it would help an
advocate impeach the government’s witnesses, I have got to turn that
over.
An impartial decision maker: I have spoken about that with
regard to the military jury.
Exclusionary rules: I have spoken of the exclusionary rule relating
to coerced evidence, but you know, this is a lay jury. They aren’t
lawyers, so there is the same concern about evidence that may be
unfairly prejudicial. One of the risks of prejudice substantially
outweighs the probative value excluded. I will talk about hearsay a
little bit later, but we generally exclude hearsay. There is a slightly
narrower aperture for hearsay than you would find in federal civilian
courts.
Self-representation: if you are familiar with Farretta v. California,
an accused can knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently waive the right of
counsel; you don’t have to be forced to take counsel, which is the
same rule we have in our civilian process.26

24.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

25.

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

26.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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Protection against double jeopardy, protection against ex post
facto laws and the right of appeal. Remember I said this is a system
within our larger system of democratic and constitutional governance:
right of appeal to a military and civilian court—United States court
of military commission review and then to the federal system, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit is
the second level of appeal, and then by petition for writ of certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court.
So those are the rights afforded to the accused under the Military
Commissions Act of 2009, and it is a system that is intended to deal
with a defined threat: Al-Qaeda and associated forces. The 9/11
Commission called Al-Qaeda a threat that was patient, lethal, and
adaptive—and that is still correct, even though the organization and
its associated forces have morphed.
It is important to have a clear eye view of this, to neither
exaggerate it nor minimize it. It is a group that intentionally targets
civilians. It uses off the shelf technologies that are increasingly easy
to get to, which enable them to combine and to figure out what the
weaknesses are of open societies.
They can strike when they want, and they are quite patient, and
while the number of casualties over a period of time might be low, it
is folly to underestimate the psychological impact of the kind of
crimes and hostile acts that they commit, and we are in this world
where we have an overlap between something that is both a crime
and an act of belligerence, and act of hostilities if illegal.
So it is important to have this view that is neither exaggerating it
nor underestimating it, because the response matters, right?
I mean, this is the kind of attack and action that tempts even
peaceful peoples to respond outside the law. And my sense is that
that’s one of the most serious mistakes you can make. You have to
respond to this within the space defined by our law and by our
values.
Within that space, we have to be relentlessly empirical and
pragmatic and use every lawful, appropriate instrument of national
power and authority to deal with them. Diplomacy, economic means,
sure. Intelligence, yes, and military force when necessary.
On the twelfth anniversary of 9/11, I was reflecting back to where
I was two years ago, and I had just been to Tarnak Farms in
Kandahar where I was working and serving at the time, and then
Garmabat Ghar, which was the Farooq camp in the Kandahar Hills
not too far from Tarnak Farms, which were the headquarters of AlQaeda and went there with some of my Afghan partners and talked to
them.
We needed to put boots on the ground there. I mean, you have
to route out places where people were plotting with impunity.
Military force—yes, when necessary. And I believe military
commissions, which do have a long history, and have been updated to
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become a national security and justice institution, a mature one for
our time, when necessary.
So it is important to keep an eye on what is this threat, one that,
again, all three branches of our government acknowledge we are in an
armed conflict with. That’s not a controversy with regard to
domestic law.
Let me get you warmed up. I will map out six different criticisms
of commissions. They will be familiar to you, and then I will take
questions.
Military commissions are condemned as—I call them the six
“uns”: unfair; unsettled; unknown; unbounded; unnecessary; and even
un-American. So let’s start with unfair.
People believe that these protections that Congress provided in
the Military Commissions Act are not enough, that they are not fair.
They don’t measure up to protections in other courts.
William Shawcross, who is the son of Lord Hartley Shawcross, the
British prosecutor at Nuremberg, has said that if the twenty-one
defendants in the docket at Nuremberg were magically transported to
Guantanamo, they would be astonished at their rights, privileges, and
immunities.27
Now, given where we have come, there has been a revolution in
constitutional criminal procedure. We think much differently about
discovery and the ability to mount a defense. That’s appropriate.
That’s an appropriate development. But it does cause you to think a
little bit differently about the notion that they are unfair.
Unsettled: this is the criticism that military commissions don’t
have a body of law. You know, it is not clear where you are going for
your legal rules or where the judge is to look for decisions. I believe
this is grossly overstated.
Military commissions draw upon an abundant source of law in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice in the military criminal trial
practice since 1950, as well as because the Military Commissions Act
points us towards federal courts for a number of areas, as well as our
federal district court decisions.
Because our practice relating to pre-2006 crimes is specifically
pointed under Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to
the law of war,28 we also must look to the international law of war.
But to imply that that is a system that lacks the anchoring—I
mean, you understand the criticism, right? Part of justice and process

27.

See William Shawcross, Lessons from Nuremberg, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/10/opinion/10shawcross.html?pagew
anted=all.

28.

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 821 art. 21.
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is a sense that you can discern what the rules are. It is an important
principle of justice and fairness.
But the judge in a military commission system can find the law
and hears it; it is in a sharply adversarial process with very competent
counsel. Issues are presented for decision in a methodical way with
appeal all the way to the Supreme Court, and decisions are made.
That’s what happens in courts every day all across the country.
And the law books are filled with disputes over what the law says and
what it means and how it applies to a particular set of facts. That
process is completely consistent with the fair administration of justice.
So that’s the unsettled argument and the counter that I would
offer to you, but we can certainly talk about it.
Unbounded: this is military jurisdiction. We are a constitutional
democracy, civilian control of the military. That’s the process, right?
Jury trial, our civilian institutions of justice, and that if you have
expansive military jurisdiction, this can undercut our civil
institutions, be corrosive of them. Understand the concern.
This goes back to Ex parte Milligan,29 ex rel Toth v. Quarles,30
Reid v. Covert,31 O’Callahan v. Parker.32 You are familiar with this
line of criticism.
The response is that this is a narrow system. Again, remember I
said this is not the separate exclusive terror court that was going to
handle all terror cases. This is a narrow jurisdiction dealing with
situations of genuine, no kidding hostilities, and hostilities have grip.
It is a standard.
If you are familiar with the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, a practice that Professor Scharf pioneered in
many ways, the Tadic case is a good articulation of what hostilities
are. It has to be protracted armed violence of a scope, nature,
intensity, and duration, that a state must use its military force to
deal with.33

29.

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (considering the jurisdiction of
military commissions).

30.

See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 (1955)
(discussing whether civilian ex-servicemen could be subjected to trial by
court-martial).

31.

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 10 (1957) (determining whether a civilian
could be subjected to trial by court-martial).

32.

O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (adjudicating on whether a
member of the Armed Forces who commits a non-military crime
cognizable in civilian courts should be tried in that forum or by courtmartial).

33.

See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No: IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment,
¶¶ 624–59 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
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That’s a standard you can present evidence on, that separates out
sporadic acts of violence. It really has to be armed conflict. That is
actually an element of every offense that has to be proven in the
military commission system. It has to be not just terrorism, the often
spectacular violence to gain a political end and intimidate the
population, et cetera, but it has to take place in the context of
hostilities.
The accused has to be an unprivileged belligerent. This is
someone who doesn’t carry arms openly, is not subordinated to a
commanding officer who causes compliance with the law of war,
doesn’t wear a uniform. You have to be an unprivileged belligerent in
the context of hostilities, and it has to be one of those thirty-two
offenses.
I am a big fan of federal courts. Federal courts can try some
3,000 crimes, a lot of precursor crimes, lots of things dealing with
terrorism. Military commissions have a very narrow sphere dealing
with violations of the law of armed conflict in the context of
hostilities.
This hypothetical you will hear of: the little old lady in
Switzerland who signs a check that winds up funding the Tamil
Tigers, a terror group. Is the military commission system really going
to haul her into court? That is just that. It is a law school
hypothetical that could never happen. It doesn’t fit the law, and it
just couldn’t happen. That’s unbounded and you have got the
comeback for it.
I have mentioned unknown. This is the idea that this is secret.
This is transparent. There are going to be a lot of secret sessions.
You think of the Quirin case.34 I was just in the Robert F. Kennedy
Department of Justice Building last week on the fifth floor there, and
they tried the Quirin saboteurs in a secret trial. This is an open
system. We follow the Press Enterprise II factors.35
In the 200 hours in court that I have had as chief prosecutor, for
Guantanamo Bay there are a little bit more than a half hour of closed
proceedings. These are on interlocutory matters, pretrial. The
government’s case will have no closure. It will be all open to the
public.
The judge in advance has to state that there is an overriding
public interest foreclosure, and if it is a national security issue, it has
to be really protecting sources and methods. It can’t be justified or
attempted purported justification that a law was broken or that it is
somehow embarrassing. He has to preserve it all on the record.

34.

Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).

35.

Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for the Cnty. of
Riverside, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
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Again, it is taking place in a sharply adversarial process, and all
parties are going to be weighing in on it, and it is preserved for
appeal. This is the Press Enterprise II factors. In Richmond
Newspapers, the Supreme Court said in the criminal context that the
people of an open society do not demand infallibility of their
institutions.36
But it is difficult for them to understand what they are prohibited
from observing, and that’s the operative principle here. This is an
open system.
We have sixty news organizations that cover
Guantanamo. There is closed circuit TV video feed to locations in
the United States.
If you have an ID card with a photo, you can get in and watch
the proceedings. It is not televised. We are using the same rule as in
federal court and in our courts-martial, but it is public and open, and
there are same day transcripts posted on www.mc.mil where you can
get all of the pleadings.
You can make sense of the proceedings and see what the parties
have briefed and what the issues are. It is so difficult to fathom the
unknown aspect, although one of the reasons I am out talking to you,
a very unlikely spokesman I am, is to try to help engender more
understanding of the system. So that’s unknown.
Unnecessary. This could be a whole discussion all in itself. We
are in this world where what something can be both a violation of
international terrorism crime and a violation of the law of armed
conflict. It is just the nature of the conflict we are in with non-state
actors who are appearing, or presenting as civilians, and you say, well,
why can’t we just do this all in a federal civilian court?
Again, I am a fan of federal civilian processes, and I believe my
brother and sister prosecutors in federal courts are doing tremendous
work and have had many convictions. Although the numbers
sometimes are overstated, they have had convictions in terrorism
cases, including about a dozen that involved Al-Qaeda defendants
who were operating overseas and were convicted of crimes that could
have been charged under the military commissions process. There
have been about a dozen since 9/11.
So why not just do it all in federal court? The analysis that one
must do is look to what each jurisdiction can charge. This is not a
novel problem. Prosecutors do this when they have concurrent
jurisdiction all the time.
You look to see what you can charge, what’s the admissible
evidence. Are there any legal barriers? You can think about
efficiency factors and strength of interest factors, like what venue are
you going to bring it? Is that a secure venue? What about the jury?

36.

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980).
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Is there some possibility for juror intimidation? I don’t think any of
these are totally dispositive.
I will tell you when I sat around the table with my fellow
prosecutors, there are actually eight who work in my organization,
eight lifetime federal civilian prosecutors from the DOJ, the noMiranda rule, we have voluntariness under the totality of the
circumstances, and we do have this slightly broader aperture for
lawfully obtained probative, reliable hearsay, where the accused or the
declarant is actually unavailable, can’t come into court.
Those rules do have bearing on whether a case might be more
appropriate for a military commission. But it deals with genuine
operational and intelligence factors involving this threat, and it has to
be in the interest of justice to leverage one of those differences. So
that’s unnecessary.
I believe there really is a category of cases in which the best
choice is a military commission. And, of course, right now, we have a
bar on having any detainee from Guantanamo. Congress, our
legislature, has said no detainees will be moved from Guantanamo to
the United States. That means the only place where we are going to
do a rigorous criminal trial beyond a reasonable doubt standard, full
discovery, notice of charges, is in a reformed military commission.
And then finally, un-American, my last comment. Anyone who
wants to call military commissions un-American should. Go ahead
and do it, but think about the historical example of John Yates Beall,
and I take you back to February of 1865. Abraham Lincoln is
reviewing the military conviction of John Yates Beall.
Beall was a confederate officer operating in upstate New York in
late 1864, and he was convicted by a military commission for having
sought to derail a civilian train. He was attacking civilians, the oldest
crime we have got in modern humanitarian law in the law of armed
conflict, violating this principle of distinction between combatants
and non-combatants.37
Beall was operating without wearing his uniform. He was in New
York. Civilian courts are open in New York. He gets tried by a
military commission. Think about what Lincoln is doing at the time
as he is reviewing it in February of 1865.
In January of 1865, he has just succeeded in getting through the
House of Representatives the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. This was popularized in the recent film, getting
through the House of Representatives the Thirteenth Amendment,
37.

See Cameron S. Moseley & Dictionary of Va. Biography, John Y. Beall
(1835-1865),
ENCYCLOPEDIA
VA.,
http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Beall_John_Y_1835-1865
(last
modified July 10, 2013); Principle of Distinction, INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/bookchapter/the-distinction-book-chapter.htm.
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seeking to make permanent the Emancipation Proclamation that he
issued earlier in the war. That’s what he is doing in January.
What’s he doing in March? In March, he gives his great second
inaugural address, you know, one of the most sublime statements in
our culture about “might” not being equated with “right.” In
between those two iconic moments in our modern constitutional
democracy, Lincoln is approving the military commission conviction
of John Yates Beall.
Now, that doesn’t settle the rightness or wrongness of military
commissions in the twenty-first century. It doesn’t even settle
Lincoln’s controversial record on civil rights in wartime, but it
certainly causes you to give pause when you want to call military
commissions un-American, I would submit. So let me stop there.
Thank you.
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